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II. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal of the District Court's 
denial of Appellants' Motion for Summary Judgment, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-
2-2. 
III. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4. Statute of limitations-Exceptions-Application. 
(1) No malpractice action against a health care provider may 
be brought unless it is commenced within two years after the 
plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable 
diligence should have discovered the injury, whichever first 
occurs . . . 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-8. Notice of intent to commence action. 
No malpractice action against a health care provider may be 
initiated unless and until the plaintiff gives the prospective 
defendant... at least ninety days' prior notice of intent to 
commence an action... .Such notice shall be served within 
the time allowed for commencing a malpractice action against 
a health care provider.... 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12. Division to provide panel - Exemption -
Procedures - Statute of limitations tolled - Composition of panel -
Expenses - Division authorized to set license fees. 
(l)(a) The division shall provide a hearing panel in alleged 
medical liability cases against health care providers . . . 
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c) The proceedings are informal, nonbinding, and are not 
subject to Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures 
Act, but are compulsory as a condition precedent to 
commencing litigation. 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40. Effect of failure of action not on merits. 
If any action is commenced within due time and . . . if the 
plaintiff fails in such action or upon a cause of action 
otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited either by 
law or contract for commencing the same shall have expired, 
the plaintiff... may commence a new action within one year 
after the . . . failure. 
5. Utah R. of Civ. P. 3 - Commencement of action. 
(a) How commenced. A civil action is commenced . . . by filing a 
complaint with the court 
IV. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah's Savings Clause allows plaintiffs who commenced their action within the 
statute of limitations period, but whose action was dismissed otherwise than on the 
merits, to refile within one year of the dismissal. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40. 
Appellants argue that the Savings Clause does not apply to Appellee's action 
because their failure to satisfy Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12's medical malpractice 
prelitigation requirements meant that they did not commence their action for purposes of 
the Savings Clause, See, e.g., Brief of Appellants at p. 12 (plaintiffs' "filing of their 
Initial Complaint could not and did not commence [their] medical malpractice 
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act ion. . . ." (emphasis added)). 
In the 1988 case of Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988), this ( mirt 
made elear (kit ihr In in "commence," for purposes of the Savings Clause, means filing 
the complaint, regardless of failure to comply with condition precedent prelitigation 
requirements. See id, at p. 254 (the specific prelitigatioii ivquiremenl foi which the case 
had been dismissed Madsen was the requirement that governmental entities be served 
with a not ice ot claim} ' (Ins ('* inn i in Madsen thus has already clearly defined the 
meaning of "commence" for purposes of determining whether the Savings Clause applies, 
having specifically stated: "In Utah, suits are commenced by the filing of a 
complaint,.,," M (emphasis added). Certainly this squares with the straightforward 
language of Utah R. Civ. P. 3: "A civil action is commenced . . . by filing a complaint 
with the cour t . . . . " 
The plaintiffs in Madsen were thus allowed to refile their case within one yeai . ( 
dismissal, pursuant It > the Savings Clause. See Madsen at 254. Under the holding and 
rationale of Madsen, therefore, the Appellees in the instant case commenced their action, 
for purposes of the Savings Clause, by filing their Compi n wo-year statute 
> ons, and they thus were appropriately allowed one year following dismissal lo 




A. MADSEN SETS FORTH THE MEANING OF "COMMENCE" FOR 
PURPOSES OF APPLICATION OF THE SAVINGS CLAUSE: 
"COMMENCE" MEANS FILING THE COMPLAINT. 
In Madsen, this Court defined "commence" as used in the Savings Clause, Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-12-40, in the context of plaintiffs whose actions are dismissed for 
failure to satisfy prelitigation requirements which are considered conditions precedent 
to the commencement of the action (the specific requirement which the Madsen 
plaintiffs failed to fulfill was service of a notice of claim on governmental entities). 
See 769 P.2d 245, 249-51, 54. The Court rejected the Madsen defendants5 argument 
that the Madsen plaintiffs' failure to comply with prelitigation requirement, which 
was conditions precedent to commencement of the action,1 (very similar to the 
language of the prelitigation panel requirement statute, § 78-14-12) meant that the 
plaintiffs had not commenced their action and thus were not entitled to refile within 
l1n footnole 6 on page 249, the Madsen Court explains that the governmental entity notice 
requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11-12 (1979) is a precondition to suit, as demonstrated 
by negative implication from the use of contrasting language regarding the governmental 
employee notice requirement, see id., which stated that notice to governmental employees "is not 
a condition precedent to the commencement of an action" (emphasis added) (the negative 
implication being that notice to governmental entities is a condition precedent to the 
commencement of an action.) Failure to serve the required notice on the governmental entities 
involved was the reason the first suit was dismissed in Madsen, yet the Madsen Court still held 
that the plaintiffs had commenced their litigation for purposes of the Savings Clause and thus 
could re-file within one-year of the dismissal. 
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the Savings Clause's one year grace period. The Court slated: 
[Defendants argue] that section 78-12-40 does not apply to this case 
because the [plaintiffs] failed to file the required notice of claim in the first 
suit and such a filing was necessary for them to "commence" the prior suit 
"within due time," as section 78-12-40 requires. [Defendants'] argument is 
without merit. In Utah, suits are commenced by the filing of a complaint 
or the service of a summons, not by the filing of a notice of claim, which is 
more properly classified as a precondition to suit than as the means of 
commencing a suit. See Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d at 149-50; Utah R. 
Civ.P. 3(a). 
See id. at p. 254. 1 \v <'ourl 's ntalion ie I Jtah K Civ P., 3 is worth emphasis. That Rule 
is as follows: 
Rule 3 - Commencement of action. 
(a) How commenced. A civil action is commenced . . . by filing a comphml 
with the cour t . . . . 
Based on the key holding quoin I above, which in turn is based upon the simple 
and straightforward language of Utah R. Civ. P. 3, the hhuiscfi ( \m\\ determined that 
the plaintiffs w lio had failed to comply with a mandatory precondition to suit, ami 
who had thus seen their complainl gel dismissed, had nonetheless commenced their 
suit for purposes of the Savings Clause. The Co ml thus allmwd (he plaintiffs to 
refilc within the Savings Clause's one-year grace period. See id. (Indeed (he MHIW II 
Court emphasized i 11.11 111 e I; 11111 n • I o comply with the condition precedent stripped the 
Court of jurisdiction and thus requiring dismissal, and tl lat it was this lack of 
jurisdiction which rendered the dismissal as being otherwise than < -n <iu tnei its so as 
to allow hn teiidne, w illn-nt offending principles of preclusion.) 
Simple and straight forward applienl ion ol I lie Mads en ruling dictates that the 
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Appellees in the instant case commenced their suit for purposes of the Savings Clause 
by filing their Complaint within the original statute of limitations period (it is 
undisputed that they filed their Complaint within the original statute of limitations 
period), and that when their case was dismissed for failure to satisfy prelitigation 
requirements, they were entitled under the Savings Clause to refile within one year 
(there is no dispute that the refiling occurred within one year of dismissal). See Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-12-40 ("If any action is commenced within due time and . . . the 
plaintiff fails in such action . . . otherwise than upon the mer i t s , . . . . he may 
commence a new action within one year . . ."); Madsen, 769 P.2d at 254 (holding that 
for purposes of the Savings Clause, "In Utah, suits are commenced by the filing of a 
complaint.") 
B. APPELLANTS' ARGUMENTS REGARDING THE 
LANGUAGE OF § 78-14-12 FAIL TO NULLIFY 
THE SIMPLE AND STRAIGHT FORWARD HOLDING OF MADSEN 
REGARDING THE MEANING OF "COMMENCE'5 
AS USED IN THE SAVINGS CLAUSE. 
Appellants argue that the language in the statute setting forth the medical 
malpractice prelitigation panel requirement, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12, should be 
interpreted so as to foreclose application of the Savings Clause. 
Their arguments are unpersuasive. 
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1. Appellee's Statutory Interpretation Arguments Fail to Trump 
Madsen's Clear Defining of "Commence" for Purposes of Applying (ii 
Savings Clause. 
Appellees write a? i they believe is the meaning and intent of 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12. However, their stati it ory inl erpretation arguments 
regarding § /N-14 •  12 do not address the key issue of the Savings Clause and 
Madsen's clear defining t>t ilk let i it "commence" therein. The applicability of the 
Savings Clause is the central issue, am Madsen, as discussed above, 
clearly resolves in Appellees' favor the issue of whether Appellee ' Yomi nonced" 
their litigation Inr purposes of the Savings Clause. 
Thus, Appellees' statutory in KMync(af ion arguments regarding Utah Code Ann. 
§ 1>>-i really miss the point. Properly understood, the strong language used in 
§78-1 r sie prelitigation panel requirement, i.e. "compulsory" and 
"condition precedent," used in § 7S- i I I,? doc;, uol contravene or negate the Savings 
Clause or Madsen, but rather provides emphasis and support lor the piopci 
com-1 us ions tlul \\K prelitigation panel requirement is a conditions precedent to ill in g 
suit and that suits filed without prior run . -kince must be dismissed, just as did the 
strong language used in the governmental entity notice retjuii'ciiienl in the si n't 
dismissal in MtalwiL See Madsen, 769 P.2d at 249, n 5-6 {see footnote 1, supra). 
Appellants' arguments beg the quoshon whether the Savings Clause applies to cases 
thus dismissed. This question is answered by Madsen,y \ ppellees 
conspicuously ignore. Appellee's extrapolations from rulings ofYouMs I'mm other 
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states should be discarded in favor of the straight forward application of this Court's 
own holding in Madsen? 
2. Under Standard Federal Savings, the Savings Clause Applies Unless the 
Legislature Makes Plain an Intention to Bar Claims Forever. Section 
78-14-12 Does Not Even Address the Savings Clause, Let Alone Make 
Plain an Intention to Bar Forever Claims of Those Who Fail to 
Comply. 
In the case of Standard Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Kirkbride, 821 
P.2d 1136 (Utah 1991), this Court held that in considering whether a statute which 
sets forth a prelitigation requirement allows those who file without first complying 
therewith the opportunity to correct their noncompliance and refile, 
The relevant inquiry is whether the legislature made plain an intention to 
bar forever claims of those who are guilty of a procedural misstep. 
Id. at 1138 (emphasis added). Section 78-14-12 does not even address the issue of 
refiling or the Savings Clause, let alone make plain an intention to foreclose 
application of the Savings Clause and bar forever dismissed claims in contravention 
of the Savings Clause. Appellants strenuously urge the Court to read into § 78-14-12 
such a legislative intention, but at best the statute is subject to differing 
2Appellants state that the 1985 legislation which implemented the prelitigation panel 
requirements at issue in this case superceded prior cases which allowed application of the 
Savings Clause, namely FoiV v. Ballinger, 60iP.2d 144 (Utah 1979). See Appellant's Brief at p. 
23, n. 3. They do not cite case law nor legislative history documenting this assertion. It is worth 
noting, in this regard, that Madsen was decided three years after the legislation in question, in 
1988. Madsen's defining of "commence" for purposes of the applying the Savings Clause so as 
to allow for refiling of cases dismissed for failure to comply with conditions precedent to 
commencement of the action, should be applied to cases dismissed for failure to comply with § 
78-14-12. 
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interpretations, and certainly does not "make plain" an intention to "bar forever" such 
claims, as would be required under the Standard Federal standard.3 
The language of § 78-14-12 is correctly interpreted as requiring that cases filed 
without prior compliance therewith must be dismissed; in other words, the failure 
cannot be excused by the court, nor can the court allow a plaintiff to fulfill the 
requirement belatedly while the action is pending or stayed; the case must be 
dismissed. In other words, the compulsory, condition precedent nature of § 78-14-
12fs prelitigation requirement means that complaints filed without fulfillment thereof 
must be dismissed, not that the Savings Clause does not and cannot apply thereafter. 
Madsen makes this distinction clear, holding that the Savings Clause applies to cases 
timely commenced, regardless of failure to satisfy conditions precedent to 
commencement of the action (and that "commence" means filing the complaint. See 
Madsen at 249-50, n. 5-6, and 254. 
Section 78-14-12 does clearly set out a mandatory condition precedent for 
commencing a suit, which means that a suit commenced without satisfaction of that 
compulsory, condition-precedent prelitigation requirement must be dismissed.4 
3It would be simple for the legislature to make such an intention plain. As merely 
one example of a statement which would make such an intention plain, the legislature 
could have included the following language: "Cases dismissed for failure to comply with 
the prelitigation panel requirement of § 78-14-12 may not be refiled pursuant to § 78-12-
40." 
4The Appellants make an attempt to extrapolate meaning and impact which would 
negate the Savings Clause from the use of the word "commence" in the language of § 78-
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While semantical arguments may be made, as Appellants have endeavored to 
12-14 (arguing that it is not the filing of the complaint which "commences" litigation, but 
the proper compliance with the prelitigation panel requirement followed by filing of the 
complaint), but their proposed meaning runs contrary to Madsen. Under Madsen, 
lawsuits are commenced by the filing of the complaint, regardless of the failure to satisfy 
a mandatory pre-condition to commencement of the suit which would thus require 
dismissal thereof. The mandatory pre-condition nature of the prelitigation requirement 
means that the suit commenced without compliance must be dismissed. See Madsen at 
136. 
In addition to the fact that the Defendants' argument regarding the word 
"commence" runs contrary to Madsen, there is no Utah Supreme Court case law directly 
supporting Defendants' contra-Madsew meaning for "commence." To the contrary, there 
is Utah Supreme Court case law which suggests the use of the word "commence" in § 78-
12-14 means nothing more than its plain meaning as set forth in the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure (and followed in Madsen) {see Rule 3, providing as follows: "Commencement 
of action, (a) How commenced. A civil action is commenced . . . by filing a complaint 
with the court . . . .") The plain and simple meaning of "commence" as used in § 78-12-
14, i.e. the initiating of the lawsuit by filing the complaint, and the incorrectness of 
twisting its meaning into something which would defeat the Savings Clause, is borne out 
in the case of Malone v. Parker, 826 P.2d 132 (Utah 1992). (Given Madsen, no further 
"bearing out" is necessary, but nonetheless Malone is worth noting.) In Malone this 
Court interpreted and ruled upon § 78-12-14 and three times used the word "initiate" in 
place of the actual term used in § 78-12-14 ("commence"), thereby casting serious doubt 
upon any interpretation of the "commence" which would transform it into anything other 
than the simple meaning of starting or initiating the lawsuit by filing the complaint in 
Court. See Malone, 826 P.2d at 133, 135, 136. This interchangeability of "commence" 
and "initiate" suggests that § 78-12-14 simply means what it says - litigants must satisfy 
the prelitigation panel requirement before starting their suit in court. Litigants who fail to 
meet that requirement will have their cases dismissed. Indeed this is reflected in exactly 
what the Utah Supreme Court did in the Malone v. Parker case: it ruled that § 78-12-14 
required proper satisfaction of the prelitigation panel requirement prior to bringing suit, 
and thus that a suit brought without satisfaction thereof was properly dismissed. See 826 
P.2d atl36; see also id, at 134 (not only did the plaintiff in Malone fail to properly 
comply with § 78-12-14, but she also failed to file her complaint within the original 
statute of limitations; the plaintiff thus had no argument for application of the Savings 
Clause because she did not timely file her complaint, and the savings clause was thus, 
presumably, not raised by plaintiff). 
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do, to attempt to advance interpretations of § 78-14-12 which would somehow negate 
the applicability of the Savings Clause, in light of Madsen and Standard Federal, these 
semantical arguments should be rejected. 
C. SOUND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS UNDERPIN 
THE SAVINGS CLAUSE AND MADSEN. 
The Savings Clause and Madsen make sense from a public policy standpoint 
and represent a fair and just approach. It is sound public policy that the substantive 
interests of justice be served where possible through adjudication of claims based 
upon their merits, and some allowance for the correction of dismissals based 
otherwise than upon the merits serves that public policy.5 
The Savings Clause and Madsen by no means excuse nor protect claimants 
against all errors and delays; to the contrary, they only provide limited relief to those 
claimants who, whatever other errors they make, nonetheless go to the court and file 
their complaint prior to the statute of limitations deadline. Those who fail to do so 
have no remedy nor protection. See, e.g., Malone v. Parker, 826 P.2d 132, 134 
(plaintiff failed to properly comply with § 78-14-12, and also failed to file her complaint 
within the original statute of limitations, and her claims were barred). 
Furthermore, the "filing of the complaint" standard under the Savings Clause 
and Madsen provides a bright line for determining which cases may be saved (only 
5It is worth noting, further, in this regard that the Appellees were acting pro se 
when their missteps under Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12 occurred. 
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those cases in which the complaint was timely filed but dismissed otherwise than 
upon the merits, and only so long as they are properly re-filed within one year of 
dismissal). This is a clear test which allows for clear analysis, and it avoids the 
murkiness of Appellants' semantical attempts to imbue § 78-14-12 with meaning 
which would negate application of the Savings Clause by circumventing the straight 




The ruling of the District Court should be affirmed. The Appellees commenced 
their action within the statute of limitations period by filing their Complaint. They refiled 
within one year following dismissal otherwise than on the merits. The Savings Clause 
applies. Their claims should be adjudicated on the merits. 
DATED THIS 18th day of February, 2003. 
JENSEN, GRAFF & BARNES, LLP 
MATTHEW T. GRAFF 
RANDALL C. ALLEN 
12 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this the 18 day of February, 2003,1 caused to be served by 
first class U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, two true copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellees 
to be served upon the following: 
David H. Epperson 
Stephen Owens 
EPPERSON & RENCHER 
10 West 100 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Brinton R. Burbidge 
Paul D. Van Komen 
BURBIDGE & WHITE 
50 South Main, #1400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 <HL= 
13 
